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1. SUMMARY: In No. 81-2337, the United States contends 
- ::l -
by the Quiet Title Act's statute of limitations. In No. 82-132, ' 
North Dakota contends that federal jurisdiction is proper under 
other statutes not containing limitations periods. 
2. FACTS and PROCEEDINGS BELOW: The United States owns 
land along the Little Missouri River in North Dakota, and claims 
title to the riverbed as a riparian landowner. Since 1955, the --- . 
United States has issued oil and gas leases on the riverbed. In 
1978, North Dakota (resp in No. 81-2337 & cross-petr in No. 82-
132; hereafter resp) brought suit against various federal 
officials (petrs in No. 81-2337 & cross-resps in No. 82-132; 
hereafter petrs), seeking an injunction prohibiting petrs from 
exercising ownership over the riverbed and a declaration that the 
... ., .· 
riverbed belonged to resp. The complaint asserted that the 
t/L i ttle Missouri River had been ~ble at the time resp was 
admitted to statehood, and that title to the riverbed had 
thereupon vested in resp under the "equal footing" doctrine, 
Shively v. Bowlby, 152 u.s. 1 (1894). 
The complaint~lleged federal jurisdiction under 28 u.s.c. 
§§1331 (federal question), 1361 (mandamus), 2201-2202 
(declaratory judgment) , and 5 U.S .c. §701-7 06 (Administrative 
Procedure Act). The DC (D.ND; Van Sickle) held that the only 
basis for jurisdiction was the Quiet Title Act, 28 u.s.c. §2409a, 
. 
and directed that the complaint be ~ dismissed unless resp amended 
the jurisdictional allegations. Resp did so. 
Petr contended at trial that the river had not been 
navigable at the time of .statehood, and that resp' s action was 
barred by the Quiet Title Act's 12-year statute of limitations, 
- 3 -
28 u.s.c. §2409a (f). The~C held that the river had been 
navigable, and that the statute of limitations did not apply to a 
suit brought by a "sovereign" with respect to "trust lands held 
in its s7 reign capacity." 
The CAB affirmed, on the ground that a statute of 
limitations applies to a sovereign state only if the statute 
expressly so states or if the legislative intent was to make the 
statute applicable to the sovereign. Weber v. Board of Harbor 
Commissioners, 85 U.S. 57 (1873). The statute of limitations in 
28 u.s.c. §2409a(f) does not expressly mention actions brought by 
states, nor does the legislative history contain any reference to 
states. Since resp is a sovereign state, §2409a(f) cannot apply 
to bar its action. 
The CA noted that §2409a is a waiver of sovereign immunity 
by the United States, and a waiver of immunity ordinarily can be 
conditioned on restrictions such as the limitations period. The 
CA characterized the issue as "a conflict between sovereign 
immunity doctrines." The conflict should be resolved in favor of 
the state, because its interest in quieting title to public trust 
lands is great and Congress has the option of amending §2409a if 
it wishes the statute of limitations to apply to states. 
The YcA also affirmed the DC's finding of navigability. 
Since the statute of limitations had been found inapplicable, the 
CA did not reach the .issue of whether resp' s original allegations 
of jurisdiction had been sufficient. 
3. CONTENTIONS 
No. 81-2337: Petr contends that the §2409a (f) statute of 
·' 
- 4 -
limitations applies, by its terms, to "[a]ny civil action under 
this section" (emphasis by petr). The United States may be sued 
only with its consent, and any conditions it chooses to put on 
its consent are binding on the courts. While statutes of 
limitations may ordinarily not apply to suits brought by 
sovereign states, this rule has no application when the suit is 
against the national sovereign. The CAB's decision conflicts 
with United States v. Louisiana, 127 U.S. 182, 192 (1888)~ United 
States v. 442,978 Square Feet of Land, San Francisco, 445 F.2d 
1180, 1187-88 (CA9 1971) ~ and California v. United States, 132 
F.Supp. 208 (Ct.Cl. 1955), all of which held general statutes of 
limitations applicable to states. The decision also conflicts 
with Park County, Montana v. United States, 626 F.2d 718 (1980), 
cert. denied, 449 u.s. 1112 (1981), which held §2409a(f) 
applicable t~ quiet title action brought by a county. 
Resp contends that statutes of limitations do not apply to 
~ . 
suits brought by states, unless states are specifically mentioned 
in the statute. This principle is particularly important where, 
as here, the state is suing in its sovereign capacity to protect 
its title to public trust lands. Title to submerged lands under 
navigable waters is a basic attribute of state sovereignty, 
guaranteed by the Constitution under the equal footing doctrine. 
h regon v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 u.s. 363 (1977). 
There is no conflict with the cases cited by petr. Park County 
involved a suit by a county, not a sovereign state. The other 
cases involved suits for money damages, not quiet title actions 
to preserve public trust lands. Finally, application of 
- 5 -
§2409a(f) to bar resp's suit would violate the Tenth Arndt because ' 
it would impair an attribute of state sovereignty. 
No. 82-132: In its conditional cross-petn, resp contends 
that the DC had jurisdiction under 28 u.s.c. §1331 to enter a 
declaratory judgment respecting the navigabi 1 i ty of the Little 
Missouri River. Petrs have ., now conceded that the Little Missouri 
t 
is navigable. This being the case, title vests indefeasibly in 
resp and no quiet title action is necessary. Petrs have no 
authority to exercise ownership rights over the riverbed, and can 
be enjoined under 5 U.S.C. §702 (the judicial review provision of 
the APA). Sovereign immunity is waived under §702. In any 
event, sovereign immunity could not bar a suit such as this one, 
in which a state in its sovereign capacity is seeking to protect 
~ its public trust lands. 
Petrs contend that they have not conceded the Little 
Missouri's navigability, and they still claim title to the 
riverbed. Resp's argument is "wholly circular." The actions of 
which resp complains are contrary to law only if resp owns the 
riverbed. Title to the riverbed is the issue on which this case 
turns. Thus, the action can be brought only under the Quiet 
Title Act. 
4. DISCUSSION: The CA' s decision runs contrary to the 
general rule that waivers of sovereign immunity are to be 
construed strictly. Under the Quiet Title Act, the United States 
has waived its immunity to suit subject to the condition that the 
suit be brought within 12 years. Although statutes of limitation 
'· 
are ordinarily inapplicable to suits by a state, the policy 
- 6 -
behind this rule (that a state's rights should not be lost due to 
a state official's negligence in failing to bring suit) is 
inapplicable when the suit is brought against the United States. 
The United States could have prevented the state from suing 
altogether, if it had chosen not to waive its sovereign immunity. 
The fact that it has chosen to waive its immunity within certain 
limits should not give the state any right to sue beyond those 
limits. 
~eneral statutes of limitations have been held applicable in 
suits brought by states against the United States. United States 
v. Louisiana, supra: United States v. 442,978 Square Feet of 
Land, San Francisco, supra: California v. United States, supra. 
In United States v. Louisiana and United States v. 442,978 Square 
· "------" Feet, the courts assumed that statutes of limitations were 
applicable and did not discuss the fact that the parties bringing 
suit were sovereign states. The court in California v. United 
States also did not discuss the issue, but cited United States v. 
Louisiana for the proposition that the statute of limitations 
applied even when the plaintiff was a state. 
As in this case, the states in United States v. 442,978 
. 
Square Feet and California v. United States were claiming title 
to submerged lands · which the United States also claimed. The 
r 
states had sought compensation under the Tucker Act rather than 
' . bringing quiet title actions, however. Resp distinguishes the 
\ 
cases on this · ground, reasoning that states have a special 
interest in protecting their title to public trust lands. 
Resp's distinction is somewhat tenuous, since the state 
.. 
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plaintiffs in the prior cases were also trying to establish their ' 
title to land. Although the issue is one the Court may wish to 
address, it may be more appropriate to wait for a future case. 
Petr points out that a number of cases raising the §2409a (f) 
statute of limitations issue are currently pending in federal 
courts. A square conflict may develop through one of these 
cases, or the CAs may carve out a special rule for statutes of 
limitations in quiet title cases. Because the prior cases 
involve different statutes of limitations and may be 
distinguishable, I recommend denial in No. 81-2337. 
Even if the Court is interested in granting No. 81-2337, I 
recommend denial in No. 82-132. The CA did not address resp's 
jurisdictional arguments, and resp would be free to raise them 
again before the CA if this Court were to reverse on the statute 
of limitations issue. 
There are responses in Nos. 81-2337 and No. 82-132. 
I recommend denial in both cases. 
09/02/82 Streisinger Opn in No. 81-2337 petn 
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A. Statutory Background 
Title 28 U.S.C. §2409a permits suit against the United 
States "to adjudicate a disputed title to real property in which 
the United States claims an interest." The important provision 
in this case is §2409a(f), which provides: 
"Any civil action under this section shall 
be barred unless it is commenced within twelve 
years of the date upon which it accrued. Such 
action shall be deemed to have accrued on the 
date the plaintiff or his predecessor in in-
terest knew or should have known of the claim 
of the United States." 
B. Facts and Decisions Below 
This case involves a dispute as to the ownership of the bed 
of the Little Missouri River in North Dakota. The US owns land 
along the river, asserts title to the river bed as a riparian 
landowner, and since at least 1955 has issued oil and gas leases 
on the river bed. In 1978 North Dakota brought this suit to stop 
this issuance of leases. The State claims that the river was 
navigable in 1889, when North Dakota became a state, and there-
fore that it has title to the river bed under the equal-footing 
doctrine. 
The State asserted jurisdiction based on 28 u.s.c. §1331 
(federal question), 28 u.s.c. §2201 (declaratory judgment), and 5 
u.s.c. §702 (APA). The US claimed that the correct jurisdiction-
al statute was the Quiet Title Act, 28 u.s.c. §2409a. 1 The DC 
Footnote(s) 1 will appear on following pages. 
'' 
' ~ 
(D. ND, Van Sickll.) agreed that 
only under §2409a, and it made the 
3. 
the suit could be mainta{ned 
State amend its complaint to 
assert juri sd ict ion on this statute. But the DC rejected the 
US's argument that the quiet title action was barred because it 
had not been brought within the 12-year p~od of limitations set 
forth in §2409a(f}. On the merits, the DC held that the river 
---------. 
was navigable in 1889 and therefore that title should be quieted 
in the State. 
~firmed. District Judge Larson (D. Minn.}, joined by 
Judges Gibson and Bright, followed the rule nullum tempus 
occurrit regi ("time does n9t r!:n again~ ":._. the _~.ing"} that stat--
utes of limitations and laches defenses may not be asserted 
against a sovereign. The court thought the rule particularly 
important here, because North Dakota was asserting title to pub-
lie trust lands, which title is a basic attribute of state sover-
eignty. This "great" interest justified overriding the normal 
rule of strict construction of waivers of sovereign immunity by 
the us. (Since it affirmed jurisdiction under §2409a, CA8 did 
not decide the State's cross-appeal from the DC's rejection of 
the claim under §1331.} CA8 then affirmed on the merits, though 
stating that "we feel that the evidence in the record concerning 
navigability is rather thin." (Pet. at 13a.} -
1As the US notes, it is more accurate to say that 
jurisdiction rests on 28 U.S.C. §1346, and that the waiver of ~ 
sovereign immunity comes from §2409a. I will not make this 







The Court granted cert. No action has been taken on re~p's 
conditional cross-petition, No. 82-132, which argues that juris-
diction properly rests on §1331 and the APA. Amicus briefs have 
been filed by the State of Colorado, and by ~other states in a 
joint brief. 
II. Discussion 
At first blush this case seems to require a simple choice 
between two rules of construction that are in conflict: { 1) the 
rule that US waivers of sovereign immunity are to be construed 
strictly, and {2) the rule that statutes of limitations do not 
apply to sovereigns absent express intent. It turns out, though, 
that the issue is more complex, as it requires consideration of 
whether the federal sovereign immunity applies at all t~ suit -- -by a state to quiet title to river beds. 
-------
A. Applicability of §2409a{f) to a State 
Section 2409a{f) 's 12-year limitation applies to "any" ac-
tion brought to quiet title. Clearly Congress did not expressly 
exempt states from this condition. 
language would control. 
~ .,.-
In a normal case the plain 
~ 
There are two complicating factors. First, the longstanding ------ :::.... 
doctrine ~+~t a statute of limitations does not run against a 
sovereign unless the sovereign is "expressly designated, or nee-
'-- -.. '\ 
essarily included by the nature of the mischiefs to be remedied." 
Weber v. Board of Harbor Commissioners, 85 u.s. 57, 70 {1873). 
~This ex~ption does not_ap~ere, as there is nothing in the 
5. 
statute or legislative history suggesting that Congress expreisly 
meant to apply §2409a(f} to states. Under this doctrine, there-
fore, North Dakota wins. But there is yet another doctrine, that 
-' 
of strict construction of waivers of immunity by the us. ~ee, 
e.g., United states v. Mitchell, 445 u.s. 535, 538 (1980}. Under 
this doctrine the US wins, since §2409a(f} -- a condition on the 
waiver of sovereign immunity does not expressly exclude 
states. 
Which doctrine should control? There is little precedent. 
Apart from CAS's decision below, ?nly one court has held that a 
~ 
federal statute of limitations does not apply to a suit by a 
state against the us. See California ex rel. State Lands Comm'n 
v. United States, 512 F. Supp. 36 (ND Cal 1981}. There are more 
cases, though still only a few, that have applied statutes of 
limitations to state plaintiffs. For example, in Park County, 
Montana v. United States, 626 F.2d 718 (CA9 1980}, CA9 stated, in 
a case brought by a county, that 
"this case involves a federal statute of limi-
tations in a suit against the United States in 
federal forum. Such statutes of limitation 
are generally applicable to governmental enti-
ties as well as individuals. See United 
States v. Louisiana, 127 U.S. 182, 185, 192 
(1888}; California v. United States, 132 F. 
S u pp. 2 0 8 ( C t . C 1. 19 55} . " 6 2 6 F . 2 d at 7 2 0 . 
See also Hart v. United States, 585 F.2d 1280 (CAS 1978}, cert. 
denied, 442 u.s. 941 (1979} (case brought city}; United States v. 
422,978 Square Feet of Land, 445 F.2d 1180 (CA9 1971}. 
That is it -- just this handful of cases on the subject. I 
am inclined to agree with the "majority" view that the limita--------- ....--....__ tions p~riod applies to state plaintiffs. My reasons are two-
6. 
' fold. First, the nullum tempus occurrit regi rule, though per-
haps "a vestigial survival of the prerogati~e of the Crown, ... 
is supportable now because its benefit and advantage extend to 
every citizen, including the defendant, whose plea of laches or 
limitation it precludes." Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 
304 u.s. 126, 132 (1938). The rule prevents a defendant from 
gaining at public expense because of the negligence of state 
agents. But this rationale seems inapplicable when there are two 
"public interests" in the case, as there are when the United 
States is the defendant seeking to vindicate a federal (i.e, 
"public") interest by raising a statute of limitations defense. 
Second, the US's sovereign immunity applies even to states, 
i.e., a state may not sue the US without its consent. See, e.g., 
California v. Arizona, 440 u.s. 59, 61-62 (1979). This means 
that the US could have prevented North Dakota from bringing this 
---------~~-------~-----------------------------
suit --or, in other words, that in this conflict between sover--eigns the US has the ultimate power. Given this, if the US re--!axes its immunity by permitting a state to sue, there seems no 
logical justification for failing to apply the normal rule of 
strict construction of the waiver. Applying a statute of limita-
tions to a state does not seem to be an intrusion on state sover-
eignty given that the state could be barred from suit altogether. 
B. Does the US have Immunity from a State's Suit to Quiet Title? 
The states' response to the above argument is to deny its 
premise. They do not argue primarily about whether the waiver of 
sovereign immunity should be strictly construed, but rather argue 
7. 
that there is no sovereign immunity here at all. That is, b'oth 
resp and the state amici urge strongly that even in the absence 
of the Quiet Title Act the US could prevented North Da-
kota from bringing this suit. Here is how the state amici make 
<., --------
the argument: 
(i) Each of the original 13 states retained as an essential 
element of sovereignty the title to the bed of any navigable wa-
ter in its boundaries. Under the 11 ~al foot~ d~c~rg, this 
rule applies to all states as of the date of their admission to 
the Union. This is the basis on which North Dakota claims title 
to the bed of the Little Missouri River. 
(ii) Because these public trust lands are an essential ele-
tions 
11 [t]his is one of those rare situa- I 
the doctrine of sovereign immunity is rendered 
inapplicable by the very nature of the constitutional compact. 11 
in which 
ment of state sovereignty, 
Brief for 28 States as Amici at 12. Under the US's view, absent 
a waiver of sovereign immunity (i.e. , the Quiet Title Act) a 
state would be foreclosed entirely from challenging a federal 
claim of ownership to the bed of a navigable river. Whatever the 
validity of otherwise prohibiting a state from suing the Federal 
Government absent consent, such a result cannot be permitted when 
the state asserts title to land based on the Constitution itself. 
(iii) Given that the Constitution itself would permit this 
suit, there would be grave constitutional problems if the Quiet 
Title Act permitted a state's claim of title to sovereign sub-







therefore, the Court should not assume that Congress intended 
that result where, as here, there is no express legislative in-
tent. It is noteworthy that the US contends that North Dakota 
should have known of the US's claim since 1955. 2 This means that 
the suit was barred as of 1967 -- yet the Quiet Title Act was not 
enacted until 1972. This would mean that Congress retroactively 
(::::' 
abolished a claim that previously could not have been time 
barred. The Court should construe the Quiet Title Act to avoid 
these constitutional problems, and thus should hold that §2409(f) 
does not apply to states. 
I am sympathetic toward this argument. In United States v. 
Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 646 (1892), the Court held that it had orig-
inal jurisdiction in a boundary suit brought by the Federal Gov-
-
ernment (on behalf of a Territory) against a state. Justice Har-
lan's opinion stated that the Framers "could not have overlooked 
the possibility that controversies, capable of judicial solution, 
might arise between the United States and some of the States, and 
that the permanence of the Union might be endangered if to some 
tribunal was not entrusted the power to determine them according 
to the recognized principles of law." Id. at 644-645. Further-
more, although a State normally must consent to be sued by an 
individual, 
2The US observes that the lower courts assumed, but did 
not decide, that North Dakota "knew or should have known" of the 
claim since 1955. Thus, if the US prevails here, a remand is in 
order on this factual question. 
I •;ry: ~ 
' ' 
.-
"[t]he question as to the suability of one 
government by another government rests upon 
wholly different grounds .... The submission 
to judicial solution of controversies arising 
between these two governments, 'each sover-
eign, with respect to the objects committed to 
it, and neither sovereign with respect to the 
objects committed to the other,' McCulloch v. 
Marx land, 4 Wheat. 316, 4 00, 410, but both 
subJect to the supreme law of the land, does 
no violence to the inherent nature of sover-
eignty. . [C]onsent [to be sued] was given 
by Texas when admitted into the Union." Id. 
at 646. 
9. 
This reasoning would apply, I think, to a suit by a state 
against the United States concerning title to submerged lands. 
It does no violence to the sovereignty of the US to permit a 
state to bring a suit to determine whether certain lands are 
those that were specifically retained by the state upon entering 
the Union. ----There is, however, a dispositive reply: the states' argument --- ___ _....__-~_.... . 
comez too late in the day. In California v. Arizona, 440 U.S. 6::--
59, 61-62 (1979), Justice Stewart stated for a unanimous Court: 
"It is well settled that the United States 
must give its consent to be sued eyeo wRen one 
of the - states i~this Court's original 
juri~ 
'It does not follow that because a State 
may be sued by th~ United States without 
its consent, therefore th~ bnited States 
may be sued by a State without its con-
sent. Public policy forbids that con-
clusion. Kansas v. United States, 204 
u.s. 331, 342. I 
See Oregon v. Hitchcock, 202 U.S. 60; Minneso-
ta v. Hitchcock, 185 u.s. 373, 387 (dicta). 
But cf. United States v. Brown, 143 U.S. 621." 
/ California v. Arizona was a suit identical to this one: 
California wanted to quiet title to a riverbed claimed under the 
10. 
equal-footing doctrine, where the United States claimed title as 
riparian owner. The Court stated flatly · that "if the United 
States has not consenfed to be sued in an action such as this, 
California's motion for leave to file a complaint must be 
denied." Id. at 62. (It also is noteworthy that United States 
v. Texas, upon which the states must rely, was dismissed with a 
"but cf." cite.) 
The state amici are correct that California v. Arizona did 
not consider the constitutional issue in the terms raised in this 
case. They also are correct that the ~ntire doctrine of US immu-
nity from suit by a state has not been well explained; the con-
trolling precedent, Kansas v. United States, simply stated that 
"public policy forbids [the] conclusion" that states may sue the 
US without its consent. See 204 u.s. at 342. 
this rule has long l Nonetheless, as Justice Stewart said, 
~ been cons ide red "well settled." Over turning it would require a 9h]i::;. 
repudiation of numerous cases in which states have not been per~ 
mitted to sue the us. It would also require repudiating the 1-p 
unanimous opinion in California v. Arizona, which expressly stat- ~ 
w~ 
ed that the Quiet Title Act's waiver of sovereign immunity was 
essential to the state's ability to bring the suit. 
In sum, I think that under the Court's decisions the US's 
sovereign immunity extends to a state suit to quiet title to sub- ~ 
merged lands. North Dakota's suit must rest on a waiver of sov------ereign immunity. And, as discussed earlier, I think that since 
the Federal Government thus has complete power to prevent such a 
suit, any waiver of immunity should be strictly construed. The 




12-year limitations period in the Quiet Title Act therefore 'ap-
plies to state plaintiffs. 
C. Alternative Jurisdictional Grounds 
CA8 ruled only that §2409a permits this suit. The Court has 
not acted on the State's conditional cross-petition, No. 82-132, 
which raises the question whether the suit could have been 
brought under other federal statutory provisions. Normally such 
an issue would be left for CA8 on remand. 
Resp continues to press this argument, however, and the SG 
is so confident that the argument is meritless that he now in-
~--- ~----------------------------------vites the Court to decide it. See Brief for US at 13 n.9. More-
ove?: thecross=-Peti tion- is virtually identical to North Dakota's 
brief in this case. Finally, if the Court rejects the State's 
argument that it has a constitutional right to sue the US in this 
type of case, independent of the Quiet Title Act, it necessarily 
rejects the State's primary ground for arguing that §1331 is a 
proper jurisdictional basis for the suit. Since the State is 
defending this suit largely on the basis of the existence of al-
ternative grounds for jurisdiction, the Court may wish to consid-
-------------------~ er granting the cross-petition. 
'-There are~~tion~l i~that would need to be decid-
ed. First, the State asserts that "the issue of navigability is 
a federal question" under §1331. Brief for resp at 28. This is 
true, see United States v. Oregon, 295 u.s. 1, 14 (1935), but 
irrelevant. This is a suit not to determine navigability, but to 




decide the federal question whether the Little Missouri River was 
navigable does not have any bearing on wh~ther the US is immune 
from the suit. North Dakota must find a waiver of sovereign im-
munity somewhere, and under my analysis the only source is the 
Quiet Title Act -- with its statute of limitations. 
The State's other argument is that the suit may be based on 
5 u.s.c. §702. North Dakota brought this suit against federal 
officials, rather than the US itself, and claims that "the actual 
title to property is not in dispute; that is merely incidental to 
the real dispute [the federal officials'] interference with 
the State's right to use and enjoy sovereign public trust land." 
Brief for Resp at 34. This is nonsense. Onwership was decided 
only in this very suit; if this is not a suit to quiet title, no 
such thing exists. I find it ridiculous for North Dakota to try 
to make this into a case of "unauthorized action of a few execu-
tive branch officers seeking to assert federal authority over the 
bed of a navigable river." Brief for resp at 28. This is a suit 
against the US. 
III. Conclusion 
CAS should be reversed, and the case should be remanded for 
II II 
findings as to when North Dakota knew or should have known that 
'-----::, 
the US asserted ownership. This will determine whether the suit -
is barred by §2409a(f) 's 12-year limitation. The Court also may 
wish to remand for consideration whether this suit may be brought 
under §1331 or the APA, though the Court perhaps should simply 





(1} In the conflict between the doctrine of strict construe-
tion of waivers of sovereign immunity and the doctrine of nullum 
tempus occurrit regi, the strict construction doctrine should 
prevail. 
(a} The nullum tempus rule's justification -- that the 
..---
public should be protected ~- does not have the same force when 
, 
the public is represented on both -~ides of the suit. 
(b) Since the US could bar the State's suit entirely, - ---------------- -- -----......___ _.,. 
it is logical to apply the strict construction rule when the US 
-----------~-----
waives its immunity to permit a State to sue. 
(2} The State's argument that the US is not immune in cases 
involving title to submerged lands is· foreclosed by this Court's 
prior cases. It " is "well settled" that the US must consent to 
all suits by states as well as by individuals. 
(3} There is no merit in the State's argument that this suit 
may be brought under §1331 or the APA. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
Nos. 81-2337 AND 82-132 
JOHN R. BLOCK, SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE, ET 
AL., PETITIONERS 
81-2337 v. 
NORTH DAKOTA, EX REL. BOARD OF UNIVERSITY 
AND SCHOOL LANDS 
NORTH DAKOTA, EX REL. BOARD OF UNIVERSITY 
AND SCHOOL LANDS, PETITIONER 
82-132 v. 
JOHN R. BLOCK, SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE, 
ETAL. 
ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT 
[April -, 1983] 
JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Under the Quiet Title Act of 1972 (QTA),t the United 
. States, subject to certain exceptions, has waived its sover--
'Act of Oct. 25, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-562, 86 Stat. 1176, codified at 28 
U. S. C. § 2409a, 28 U. S. C. § 1346(f), and 28 U. S. C. § 1402(d). 
The provision relevant to the present case, 28 U. S. C. § 2409a, state: 
(a) The United States may be named as a party defendant in a civil action 
under this section to adjudicate a disputed title to real property in which 
the United States claims an interest, other than a security interest or 
water rights. This section does not apply to trust or restricted Indian 
lands, nor does it apply to or affect actions which may be or could have 
been brought under sections 1346, 1347, 1491, or 2410 of this title, sections 
7424, 7425, or 7426 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended (26 
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eign immunity and has permitted plaintiffs to name it as a 
party defendant in civil actions to adjudicate title disputes in-
volving .real property in which the United States claims an 
interest. These cases present two separate issues concern-
ing the QTA. The first is whether Congress intended the 
QTA to provide the exclusive procedure by which a claimant 
can judicially challenge the title of the United States to real 
property. The second is whether the QTA's twelve-year 
statute of limitations, 28 U. S. C. § 2409a(f), is applicable in 
U. S. C. 7424, 7425, and 7426), or section 208 of the Act of July 10, 1952 (43 
u. s. c. 666). 
(b) The United States shall not be disturbed in possession or control of any 
real property involved in any action under this section pending a final judg-
ment or decree, the conclusion of any appeal therefrom, and sixty days; and 
if the final determination shall be adverse to the United States, the United 
States nevertheless may retain such possession or control of the real prop-
erty or of any part thereof as it may elect, upon payment to the person 
determined to be entitled thereto of an amount which upon such election 
the district court in the same action shall determine to be just compensa-
tion for such possession or control. 
(c) The complaint shall set forth with particularity the nature of the right, 
title, or interest which the plaintiff claims in the real property, the circum-
stances under which it was acquired, and the right, title, or interest 
claimed by the United States. 
(d) If the United States disclaims all interest in the real property or inter-
est therein adverse to the plaintiff at any time prior to the actual com-
mencement of the trial, which disclaimer is confirmed by order of the court, 
the jurisdiction of the district court shall cease unless it has jurisdiction of 
the civil action or suit on ground other than and independent of the author-
ity confered by section 1346(f) of this title. 
(e) A civil action against the United States under this section shall be tried 
by the court without a jury. 
(f) Any civil action under this section shall be barred unless it is com-
menced within twel~ years of the date upon which it accrued. Such ac-
tion shall be deemed to have accrued on the date the plaintiff or his prede-
cessor in interest knew or should have known of the claim of the United 
States. 
(g) Nothing in this section shall be construed to permit suits against the 
United States based upon adverse possession. 
' . 
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instances where the plaintiff is a State, such as respondent 
North Dakota. We conclude that the QTA forecloses the 
other bases for relief urged by the State, and that the limita-
tions provision is as fully applicable to North Dakota as it is 
to all others who sue under the QTA. 
I 
It is undisputed that under the equal footing doctrine first 
set forth in Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 3 How. 212 (1845), 
North Dakota, like other States, became the owner of the 
beds of"'ilaVigable streams in the Stafebponit'S'"aamiSsion to 
theumoll.' Ii1salsoagreed that under the law of North Da-
kota, a riparian owner has title to the middle of the bed of a 
non-navigable stream. Because of differing views of naviga-
b~, the United States a~rth b lttttmr a"sse'ff competing 
c aims to title to certain portions of the bed of the Little Mis-
souri River within North Dakota. The United States con-
tends that the river is not now and never has been navigable, 
and it claims most of the disputed area based on its status as 
riparian landowner. 2 North Dakota, on the other hand, as-
serts that the river was navigable on October 1, 1889, the 
date North Dakota attained statehood, and therefore that 
title to the disputed bed vested in it under the equal footing 
doctrine on that date. Since at least 1955, the United States 
has been issuing riverbed oil and gas leases to private 
entities. 
Seeking to resolve this dispute as to ownership of the riv-
erbed, North Dakota filed this suit in the District Court 
against several federal officials. 3 The State's complaint re-
2 In some parts of the disputed areas, the United States' claim to the 
bed is founded on reasons other than its status as riparian landowner. See 
Tr. 38-48. 
3 The complaint named as defendants the Secretary of the Interior, the 
Secretary of Agriculture, the Director of the United States Bureau of Land 
Management, and the Chief of the United States Forest Service. App. 6. 
The defendants were alleged to have "final authority" over the agencies 
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quested injunctive and mandamus relief directing the defend-
ants to "cease and desist from develop[ing] or otherwise ex-
ercising privileges of ownership upon the bed of the Little 
Missouri River within the State of North Dakota," and it fur-
ther sought a declaratory judgment "[d]eclaring the Little 
Missouri River to be a navigable river for the purpose of 
determining ownership of the bed." App. 9. As the juris-
dictional basis for its suit, North Dakota invoked 28 U. S. C. 
§ 1331 (federal question); 28 U. S. C. § 1361 (mandamus); 28 
U. S. C. §§ 2201-2202 (declaratory judgment and further re-
lief) and 5 U. S. C. §§ 701-706 (the judicial review provisions 
of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. §§ 551 et 
seq.). App. 6. North Dakota's original complaint did not 
mention the QTA. However, the District Court required 
the State to amend its complaint to recite a claim thereunder. 
App. to Pet. for Cert. 14a-16a. The State complied and filed 
an amended complaint. App. 13--16. 4 
The matter thereafter proceeded to trial. North Dakota 
introduced evidence in support of its claim that the river was 
navigable on the date of statehood. 5 The federal defend-
ants, while denying navigability, presented no evidence on 
this point; 6 their evidence was limited to showing, for statute 
of limitations purposes, that the State had notice of the 
that were "presently unlawfully asserting ownership over sovereign lands 
of the State of North Dakota." App. 7. 
' North Dakota's amended complaint did not name the United States as 
a party defendant, even though the United States appears to be the only 
proper federal defendant under 28 U. S. C. § 2409a(a). The Solicitor Gen-
eral has expressly waived any objection the United States or the defend-
ants might have as to this point. Brief for Petitioners 31, n. 20. 
6 North Dakota's cas~ consisted of documentary evidence of canoe travel 
on the river prior to statehood, an effort to float logs down the river shortly 
after statehood, present-day recreational canoe traffic, and other small 
craft usage over the years. · 
6 The federal defendants took the position that the State's evidence of 
navigability was so weak that it actually supported the view that the river 
was non-navigable. 
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United States' claim more than twelve years prior to the 
commencement of th~uit. 
After trial, the \District Court rendered judgment for 
North Dakota. The court first concludeaffiat me L"ittteMis--so uri River was navigable in 1889 and that North Dakota at-
tained title t~ehood under the equal footing 
doctrine and the Submerged Lands Act, 42 U. S. C. 
§ 1311(a). 506 F. Supp. 619, 622-624 (D. N.D. 1981). Then, 
applying what it deemed to be an accepted rule of construc-
tion that statutes of limitations do not apply to sovereigns un-
less a contrary legislative intention is clearly evident from 
the express language of the statute or otherwise, the court 
rejected the defendants' claim that North Dakota's suit was 
barred by the QTA's twelve-year statute of limitations, 28 
U.S. C. §2409a(f). 506 F. Supp., at 625--626. 7 The Dis- 1.)-.c::..-
trict Court accordingly entered judgment quieting North Da-
kota's title to the bed of the river. App. to Pet. for Cert. 
29a-30a. 8 The Court of Appeals affirmed in all respects. 
671 F. 2d 271 (CAS 1~
The defendants' petition for certiorari, which we granted, 
7 To further support this conclusion, the court stated, albeit without 
elaboration, that the legislative history of the QTA showed that Congress 
intended the statute of limitations "to apply exclusively to persons, be they 
private citizens or public or private corporations." 506 F. Supp. 619, 625 
(D. N.D. 1981). The court also commented that the federal defendants' 
position was contrary to the express will of Congress, as indicated by the 
Submerged Lands Act, 43 U. S. C. § 131l(a). 506 F. Supp., at 626. 
The defendants also argued in the Bistrict Court that the United States 
had acquired title to the bed by adverse possession, and that, in any event, 
the suit was barred by laches. The District Court rejected both of these 
contentions, 506 F. Supp., at 624-626, and the defendants did not pursue 
them further. • 
8 The judgment excluded those portions of the bed in which the Three 
Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation had an interest. The 
Tribes were not named as parties to the State's suit, and the court con-
cluded that their rights should be left unaffected by the judgment. 506 
F. Supp., at 622. 
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-- U. S. -- (1982), challenged only the Court of Appeals' 
conclusion that the QTA's statute of limitations is inapplica-
ble to States. North Dakota filed a conditional cross-peti-
tion, No. 82-132, asserting that even if its suit under the QTA 
is barred by§ 2409a(f), the judgment below is still correct be-
cause the QTA remedy is not exclusive and its suit against 
the federal officers is still maintainable wholly aside from the 
QTA. This submission, which the Court of Appeals did not 
find it necessary to address, is also urged by the State, as re-
spondent in No. 81-2337, as a ground for affirming the judg-
ment in its favor. See United States v. New York Telephone 
Co., 434 U. S. 159, 166, n. 8 (1977); Dayton Board of Educa-
tion v. Brinkman, 433 U. S. 406, 419 (1977). We now grant 
the cross-petition, which heretofore has remained pending, 
and we first address the question presented by it. 
II 
The states of the Union, like all other entities, are barred 
by federal sovereign immunity from suing the United States 
in the absence of an express waiver of this immunity by Con-
gress. California v. Arizona, 440 U. S. 59, 61-62 (1979); 
Minnesota v. United States, 305 U. S. 382, 387 (1939); Kan-
sas v. United States, 204 U. S. 331, 342 (1907). Only upon 
passage of the QTA did the United States waive its immunity 
with respect to suits involving title to land. Prior to 1972, 
States and all others asserting title to land claimed by the 
United States had only limited means of obtaining a resolu-
tion of the. title dispute-they could attempt to induce the 
United States to file a quiet title action against them, or they 
could petition Congress or the Executive for discretionary re-
lief. Also, since passa,ge of the Tucker Act in 1887, those 
claimants willing to settle for monetary damages rather than 
title to the disputed land could sue in the Court of Claims and 
attempt to make out a constitutional claim for just compensa-
tion. See 28 U. S. C. § 1491; Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U. S. 
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643, 647 n. 8 (1962). 
Enterprising claimants also pressed the so-called "officer's 
suit" as another possible means of obtaining relief in a title 
dispute with the Federal Government. In the typical offi-
cer's suit involving a title dispute, the claimant would pro-
ceed against the federal officials charged with supervision of 
the disputed area, rather than against the United States. 
The suit would be in ejectment or, as here, for an injunction 
or a writ of mandamus forbidding the defendant officials from 
interfering with the claimant's property rights. I 
As a device for circumventing federal sovereign immunity 
in land title disputes, the officer's suit ultimately did not 
prove to be successful. This Court appeared to accept the 
device in early cases. See United States v. Lee, 106 U. S. 
196 (1882); Meigs v. M'Clung's Lessee, 9 Cranch 11 (1815). 
Later cases, however, were inconsistent; some held that such 
suits were barred by sovereign immunity, while others did 
not, and "it is fair to say that to reconcile completely all the 
decisions of the Court in this field . . . would be a Procrus-
tean task." Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U. S. 643, 646 (1962). 
Compare, e. g., the cases cited id., at 646, n. 6, with those 
cited id., at 646, n. 7. 
In Malone, the court cut through the tangle of the previous 
decisions and applied to land disputes the rule announced in 
Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Corp., 337 U. S. 682 (1949): 
"the action of a federal officer affecting property claimed 
by a plaintiff can be made the basis of a suit for specific 
relief against the officer as an individual only if the offi-
cer's action is 'not within the officer's statutory powers 
or, if within those powers, only if the powers, or their 
exercise in -the particular case, are constitutionally 
void."' Malone, supra, at 647 (quoting Larson, supra, 
at 702). 
The Larson-Malone test plainly made it more difficult for a 
.. 
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plaintiff to employ a suit against federal officers as a vehicle 
for resolving a title dispute with the United States. Thus, in 
the decade after Malone, claimants having disputes with the 
United States over real property met with little success in 
most courts. 9 
Against this background, Congress considered and passed 
the QTA in 1972. At a hearing on the bill, the officer's-suit 
possibility was called to the attention of Congress. 10 The 
predominant view, however, was that citizens asserting title 
to or the right to possession of lands claimed by the United 
States were "without benefit of a recourse to the courts," be-
cause of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 11 
Congress sought to rectify this state of affairs. The origi-
nal version of S. 216, the bill that became the QTA, was short 
and simple. Its substantive provision provided for no quali-
fications whatsoever. It stated in its entirety: "The United 
States may be named a party in any civil action brought by 
any person to quiet title to lands claimed by the United 
States." 117 Gong. Rec. 46380 (1971). The Executive 
Branch opposed the original version of S. 216 and proposed, 
in its stead, a more-elaborate bill, reprinted in S. Rep. 
9 See, e. g., County of Bonner v. Anderson, 439 F. 2d 764 (CA9 1971); 
Simson v. Vinson, 394 F. 2d 732 (CA5), cert. denied, 393 U. S. 968 (1968); 
Gardner v. Harris, 391 F. 2d 885 (CA5 1968); Switzerland Co. v. Udall, 
337 F. 2d 56 (CA4 1964), cert. denied, 380 U. S. 914 (1965). One court of 
appeals, however, construed Malone narrowly. See Armstrong v. Udall, 
435 F. 2d 38, 42 (CA9 1970); Andros v. Rupp, 433 F. 2d 70, 73-74 (CA9 
1970) (holding Malone to be inapplicable where the plaintiff has record title 
to the disputed land). 
10 See Hearing before the Subcomm. on Public Lands of the Senate 
Comm. on Interior l\Pd Insular Affairs on S. 216, S. 579, and S. 721, 92nd 
Cong., 1st Sess., p. 64 (1971) (statement of Prof. J. Steadman); id., at 81 
(letter from L. Gendron, Esq.). 
"S. Rep. No. 92-575, p. 1 (1971). See also H. R. Rep. No. 92-1559, 
p. 6 (1972); id., at 9 (letter from the Attorney General); Hearing, supra 
note 10, at 8 (Sen. Church); id., at 2, 19 (M. Melich, Solicitor, Dept. of the 
Interior); id., at 45 (letter from Sen. Hansen); id., at 55 (T. McKnight); id., 
at 74 (letter from R. Reynolds); id., at 77 (statement ofT. Cavanaugh) . 
. ·~ ... 
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92-575, pp. 7-8 (1971), providing several "appropriate safe-
gu~ds for the protection of the public interest." 12 
1/l'his Executive proposal, made by the Justice Department, 
limited the waiver of sovereign immunity in several impor-
tant respects. First, it excluded Indian lands from the scope 
of the waiver. The Executive branch felt that a waiver of 
immunity in this area would not be consistent with "specific 
commitments" it had made to the Indians through treaties 
and other agreements. 13 Second, in order to insure that the 
waiver would not "serve to disrupt costly ongoing Federal 
programs that involve the disputed lands," the proposal al-
lowed the United States the option of paying money damages 
instead of surrendering the property if it lost a case on the 
merits. 14 Third, the Justice Department proposal provided 
that the legislation would have prospective effect only; that 
is, it would not apply to claims that accrued prior to the date 
of enactment. This was deemed necessary so that the work-
load of the Justice Department and the courts could develop 
at a rate which could be absorbed. 15 Fourth, to ensure that 
stale claims would not be opened up to litigation, 16 the pro-
posed bill included a six-year statute of limitations. 17 
The Senate accepted the Justice Department's proposal, 
with the notable exception of the provision that would have 
given the bill prospective effect only. The Senate-passed 
12 Hearing, supra note 10, at 21 (S. Kashiwa, Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral); see id. at 32 (J. McGuire, Dept. of Agriculture). 
13 !d., at 2, 19 (M. Melich, Solicitor, Dept. of the Interior). 
14 Ibid. See also id., at 3, 32 (views of Dept. of Agriculture); S. Rep. 
No. 92-575, pp. 5-6 (1971) (letter from the Attorney General). 
16 !d. , at 7 (letter from the Attorney General). 
16 H. R. Rep. No. 92-1558, p. 7 (1972) (letter from the Deputy Attorney 
General). 
17 The Justice Department proposal contained other, relatively minor 
limitations on the waiver. For example, it expressly stated that no one 
could claim against the United States by adverse possession, and it pro-
vided for exclusive federal jurisdiction. All of these changes were ulti-
mately included in the legislation . 
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version of the bill contained a "grandfather clause" that 
would have allowed old claims to be asserted for two years 
after the bill became law. 18 
Primarily because of the grandfather clause, the Executive 
Branch could still not accept the bill. The Department of 
Justice argued that this clause could cause "a flood of litiga-
tion on old claims, many of which had already been submitted 
to the Congress and rejected," thereby putting "an undue 
burden on the Department and the courts." 19 As a compro-
mise, the Department proposed to give up its insistence on 
"prospective only" language and to accept an increase in the 
statute of limitations to twelve years, in exchange for elimi-
nation of the grandfather clause. 20 This proposal had the ef-
fect of making the bill retroactive for a twelve-year period. 
The House included this compromise in the version of the bill 
passed by it, and the Senate acquiesced and the bill became 
law with the compromise language intact. 
In light of this legislative history, we need not be detained 
long by North mteota's contention that it can avoid the 
QTA's statute of limitations and other restrictions by the de-
vice of an officer's suit. If North Dakota's position were cor-
rect, all of the carefully-crafted provisions of the QTA 
deemed necessary for the protection of the national public in-
terest could be averted. "It would require the suspension of 
disbelief to ascribe to Congress the design to allow its careful 
18 This provision stated that an action would be barred unless an action 
was begun "within six years after the claim for relief first accrues or within 
two years after the effective date of this Act, whichever is later." 117 
Cong. Rec. 46380 (1971) (emphasis added). 
19 H. R. Rep. No. 92-1558, p. 7 (1972) (letter from the Deputy Attorney 
General). -
20 Id., at 7-8. The Department of Justice also objected to a provision in 
the Senate-passed version that would have made the limitations period be-
gin to run only on the date that the United States obtained actual knowl-
edge of the claim. The Department contended that the limitations period 
should begin to run on the date the claimant knew or should have known of 
the United States' claim, see ibid., and Congress agreed to this change. 
' • "'1' 
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and thorough remedial scheme to be circumvented by artful 
pleading." Brown v. GSA, 425 U. S. 820, 833 (1976). 
If we were to allow claimants to try the federal govern-
ment's title to land under an officer's-suit theory, the Indian 
lands exception to the QTA would be rendered nugatory. 
The United States could also be dispossessed of the disputed 
property without being afforded the option of paying dam-
ages, thereby thwarting the congressional intent to avoid dis-
ruptions of costly federal activities. Finally, and most rele-
vantly to the present case, the QTA's twelve-year statute of 
limitations, the one point on which the Executive Branch was 
most insistent, could be avoided, and, contrary to the wish of 
Congress, an unlimited number of suits involving stale claims 
might be instituted. 
v13rown v. GSA, supra, is instructive here. In that case, 
we held that§ 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. 
§ 2000e-16, was the exclusive remedy for federal employment 
discrimination. There, as here, it was "problematic" 
whether any judicial relief at all was available prior to pas-
sage of the Act; the prevailing congressional view was that 
there was none. 425 U. S., at 826--828. There, as here, the 
"balance, completeness, and structural integrity" of the stat-
ute belied the contention that it "was designed merely to sup-
plement other judicial relief." I d., at 832. Thus, we applied 
the rule that a precisely drawn, detailed statute preempts 
more general remedies. I d., at 834. 21 That rule is equally 
applicable in the present context. 
Accordingly, we need not reach the question whether, 
prior to 1972, Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Corp., supra, 
and Malone v. Bawdoin, supra, would have permitted an of-
ficer's suit to be maintained under the present circum-
21 See also Great American Fed. S . & L. Assn. v. Novotny, 442 U. S. 
366, 375--377 (1979); Preiser v. Rodriquez, 411 U. S. 475, 488-490 (1973); 
United States v. Demko, 385 U. S. 149, 151-152 (1966); 1A C. Sands, Stat-
utes and Statutory Construction § 23.16 (4th ed. 1972). 
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stances. 22 w@,hat Congress intended the QTA to pro-
vide the exclusive means by which adverse claimants could 
challenge ~ates' title to real property. 
III 
We also cannot agree with North Dakota's submission, 
which was accepted by the District Court and the Court of 
Appeals, that the States are not subject to the operation of 
§ 2409a(f). This issue is purely one of statutory interpreta-
tion, and we find no support for North Dakota's position in 
either the plain statutory language or the legislative history. 
The basic rule of federal sovereign immunity is that the I 
United States cannot be sued at all without the consent of 
Congress. A necessary corollary of this rule is that when 
Congress attaches conditions to legislation waiving the sover-
eign immunity of the United States, those conditions must be 
strictly observed, and exceptions thereto are not to be lightly 
implied. See, e. g., Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U. S. 156, 
160-161 (1981); United States v. Kubrick, 444 U. S. 111, 
117-118 (1979); Honda v. Clark, 386 U. S. 484, 501 (1967); 
· Soriano v. United States, 352 U. S. 270 (1957); United States 
v. Sherwood, 312 U. S. 584, 591 (1941). When waiver legis-
lation contains a statute of limitations, the limitations provi-
sion constitutes a condition on the waiver of sovereign immu-
22 We also reject North Dakota's claim that, even if the QTA preempted 
alternatives remedies in 1972, Congress created a new supplemental rem-
edy four years later when it amended 5 U. S. C. § 702 with Pub. L. No. 
94-574, 90 Stat. 2721 (1976). That statute waived federal sovereign im-
munity for suits against federal officers in which the plaintiff seeks relief 
other than money damages, but it specifically confers no "authority to 
grant relief if any other statute that grants consent to suit expressly or 
impliedly forbids the-relief which is sought." The QTA is such an "other 
statute," because, if a suit is untimely under the QTA, the QTA expressly 
"forbids the relief" which would be sought under§ 702. See H. Rep. No. 
94-1656, p. 13 (1976) (§ 702 provides no authority to grant relief "when 
Congress has dealt in particularity with a claim and [has] intended a speci-
fied remedy to be the exclusive remedy"). 
. 
' 
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nity. Accordingly, although we should not construe such a 
time-bar provision unduly narrowly, we must be careful not 
to interpret it in a manner that would "extend the waiver be-
yond that which Congress intended." United States v. Ku-
brick, supra, at 117-118 (citing Soriano v. United States, 
supra; Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U. S. 61 
(1955)). Accordingly, before finding that Congress intended 
here to exempt the States from satisfying the time-bar condi-
tion on its waiver of immunity, we should insist on some clear 
indication of such an intention. 
Proceeding in accordance with these well-established prin-
ciples, we observe that § 2409a(f) expressly states that any 
civil action is time-barred unless filed within twelve years 
after the date it accrued. The statutory language makes no 
exception for civil actions by States. Nor is there any evi-
dence in the legislative history suggesting that Congress in-
tended to exempt the State from the condition attached to 
the immunity waiver. 23 These facts alone, in the light of our 
approach to sovereign immunity cases, would appear to com-
pel the conclusion that States are not entitled to an exemp-
tion from the strictures of§ 2409a(f). 
The State, however, relies on the well-known canon of 
statutory construction that "[s]tatutes of limitations are not 
... held to embrace the state, unless she is expressly desig-
nated, or necessarily included by the nature of the mischiefs 
to be remedied." Weber v. Board of Harbor Commissioners, 
18 Wall. 57, 70 (1873). Accord, Guaranty Trust Co. v. 
23 Recognizing that no express legislative history supports its position, 
North Dakota relies on congressional silence. As did the Court of Ap-
peals, 671 F . 2d 271,. 274-275 (CA8 1982), North Dakota notes the refer-
ences in the House committee report, H. R. Rep. No. 92-1558 (1972), to 
"persons," "citizens," and "individual citizens," and the absence of any ref-
erences to "states." However, to the extent that such general language 
has any relevance at all, the report also refers to "plaintiff[s)," "owners of 
adjacent property," "land owner[s]," and "claimants"-all terms that can 
easily encompass States. See also S. Rep. No. 92-575 (1971). 
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United States, 304 U. S. 126, 132-133 (1938). Because 
§ 2409a(f) does not expressly include the State, North Dakota 
urges, and the Court of Appeals held, that the State was not 
barred by the statute. While recognizing that immunity 
waivers by the United States are to be carefully construed, 
the Court of Appeals concluded that precedence should be 
given to the competing canon of statutory construction that 
statutes of limitations should not apply to the States absent 
express legislative inclusion. 671 F. 2d, at 275-276. 
We do not agree. In fashioning sovereign-immunity 
waiver legislation, Congress is certainly free to exempt the 
States from a statute of limitations or any other condition of 
the waiver. But there is no merit to North Dakota's asser-
tion that a condition on a congressional waiver of federal sov-
ereign immunity should be regarded as inapplicable to States 
in the absence of express intent to the contrary. This Court 
has never sanctioned such a rule. Quite the contrary, in 
United States v. Louisiana, 127 U. S. 182 (1888), the Court 
held that a general statute of limitations, one that did not ex-
pressly mention States, barred a State's claim against the 
Federal Government. And in Minnesota v. United States, 
supra, at 388--389, where the United States had waived its 
immunity on the condition that any suit against it had to 
brought in a federal court, we concluded without hesitation 
that the plaintiff State's suit should have been dismissed for 
lack of jurisdiction, because it had been filed in state court. 
Thus, neither Congress nor the decisions of this Court have 
suggested that the States are exempt from satisfying the 
conditions placed by Congress on its immunity waivers; and, 
in light of our Constitution, which makes the federal law ulti-
mately supreme, these holdings should not have been 
surprising. 
We do not discount the importance of the generally appli-
cable rule of statutory construction relied upon by the Court 
of Appeals. The judicially-created rule that a sovereign is 
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statute of limitations has retained its vigor because it serves 
the public policy of preserving the public rights, revenues, 
and property from injury and loss, by the negligence of public 
officers. Guaranty Trust Co. v. New York, supra, at 132. 
Thus, in this case, the rule would further the interests of the 
citizens of North Dakota, by affording them some protection 
against the negligence of state officials in failing to comply 
with the otherwise applicable statute of limitations. 
As we have said, however, we must follow the will of Con-
gress. As the legislative history outlined in Part II above 
shows, Congress agreed with the Executive that § 2409a(f) 
was necessary for protection of national public interests. In 
general, a suit by a State against the United States affects 
the congressionally-recognized national public interests to 
the same degree as does a suit by a private entity. There-
fore, the judge-created rule designed to protect the interests 
of the citizens of one particular State must yield in the face of 
the evidence that Congress has determined that the national 
interest requires a contrary rule. We are convinced that 
Congress had no intention of exempting the States from com-
pliance with § 2409a(f). That section must be applied to the 
States because they are "necessarily included by the nature 
of the mischiefs to be remedied." Weber v. Board of Harbor 
Commissioners, supra, at 70. We thus conclude that States 
must fully adhere to the requirements of § 2409a(f) when su-
ing the United States under the QTA. 
IV 
North Dakota finally argues that, even if Congress in-
tended to apply § 2409a(f) to it, and even if valid when applied 
in suits relating to other kinds of land, the section is 
unconstititional under the equal footing doctrine and the 
Tenth Amendment insofar as it purports to bar claims to 
lands constitutionally vested in the State. We are unable to 
agree. 
The State probably is correct in stating that Congress 
'· 
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could not, without making provision for payment of com-
pensation, pass a law depriving a State of land vested in it by 
the Constitution. Such a law would not run afoul of the 
equal footing doctrine or the Tenth Amendment, as asserted 
by North Dakota, but it would constitute a taking of the 
State's property without just compensation, in violation of 
the Fifth Amendment. 24 Section 2409a(f), however, does not 
purport to strip any State, or anyone else for that matter, of ( 
any property rights. The statute limits the time in which a 
quiet title suit against the United States can be filed; but, un-
like an adverse possession provision, § 2409a(f) does not pur-
port to effectuate a transfer of title. If a claimant has title to 
a disputed tract of land, he retains title even if his suit to 
quiet his title is deemed time-barred under § 2409a(f). A dis-
missal pursuant to § 2409a(f) does not quiet title to the prop-
erty in the United States. The title dispute remains unre-
solved. 25 Nothing prevents the claimant from continuing to 
assert his title, in hope of inducing the United States to file 
its own quiet title suit, in which the matter would finally be 
put to rest on the merits. 26 
24 The United States can, of course, exercise its eminent domain power 
to take title to State property. Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F . At-
kinson Co., 313 U. S. 508, 534 (1941). See also United States v. Carmack, 
329 u. s. 230, 23~242 (1946). 
25 This discussion also answers the argument that our holding conflicts 
with the Submerged Lands Act of 1953, 43 U. S. C. § 1311, which con-
firmed in the States title to lands beneath navigable waters within their 
boundaries. If the river is navigable, the land in question belongs to 
North Dakota, in accordance with the Constitution and the Submerged 
Lands Act, regarpless of whether North Dakota's suit to quiet its title is 
time-barred under§ 2409a(f). 
26 Whether, in the absence of a suit by it, the United States would ever 
acquire good title to the disputed area would, under the present status of 
the law, be strictly a matter of State law. See H. R. Rep. No. 92-1559, p. 
10 (1972) (letter from the Attorney General) ("The State law of real prop-
erty would of course apply to decide all questions not covered by Federal 
law."). In many instances, the United States would presumably eventu-
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Thus, we see no constitutional infirmity in § 2409a(f). A 
cause of action grounded on a constitutional claim can become 
time-barred just as any other claim can. See, e. g., Board of 
Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U. S. 478 (1980); Soriano v. United 
States, 352 U. S. 270 (1957). Nothing in the Constitution re-
quires otherwise. 
v 
Admittedly, North Dakota comes before us with an appeal-
ing case. Both lower courts held that the Little Misouri is 
navigable and that the State obtained title to the disputed 
land at statehood. The federal defendants have not asked 
this Court to review the correctness of these substantive 
holdings other than to submit that these determinations are 
time-barred by the QTA. 'fl We agree with this submission. 
Whatever the merits of the title dispute may be, the federal 
defendants are correct: If North Dakota's suit is barred by 
§ 2409a(f), the courts below had no jurisdiction to inquire into 
the merits. 
In view of the foregoing, the judgment of the Court of Ap-
peals is reversed. North Dakota's action may proceed, if at 
all, only under the QTA. If the State's suit was filed more 
than twelve years after its action accrued, the suit is barred 
by § 2409a(f). Since the lower courts made no findings as to 
the date on which North Dakota's suit accrued, the case must 
be remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
So ordered. 
ally take the land by adverse possession, but, if so, it would be purely by 
the virtue of State law. Here, North Dakota asserts that the disputed 
land is public trust land that cannot ever be taken by adverse possession 
under North Dakota"iaw. 
27 The federal defendants stress that the United States still disputes the 
lower courts' conclusion that the Little Missouri River is navigable. They 
state that they did not seek review of that finding in this Court only be-
cause they deemed it inappropriate to burden this Court with this purely 
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